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PROBLEMS IN DEFINING AND CONTROLLING
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Linda Galler*

A lively debate is taking place within the states on the question whether
lawyers should be permitted to practice law in professional services organizations that
provide both legal and nonlegal services and that are owned, in whole or in part, by
nonlawyers. At this time, the states are divided; some endorse the notion of
multidisciplinary practice (MDP) while others do not.' At its August 2000 meeting,
the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates rejected a proposal to
permit lawyers practicing in MDPs to render legal services. In so doing, the House
urged the states to enforce their laws prohibiting the practice of law by entities other
than law firms and, to that end, admonished states to reevaluate and refine their
definitions of the "practice of law".2 The House reasoned that a clear delineation of
law practice would enable states to vigorously police the unauthorized practice of law
(UPL) by nonlawyers. 3
*
Linda Galler is Professor of Law at Hofstra University School of Law. She
chairs the ABA Tax Section Committee on Standards of Tax Practice. Her teaching and
scholarship focus on taxation and ethics in federal tax practice. Before joining the Hofstra
faculty, she practiced law with Shearman & Sterling and Milbank and with Tweed, Hadley, &
McCloy in New York.
1.
A web site maintained by the ABA reflects that as of March 5, 2002, the
following state bars have voted in favor of MDP to some degree or have received a reports from
duly authorized committees or commissions endorsing the concept of MDP: Arizona,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. The following state bars have rejected MDP or
have received reports from duly authorized committees or commissions recommending that
MDPs not be permitted: Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. AtmRICAN BAR ASS'N, MDP INFORMATION, at
http:llwwv.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state-summ.html (last visited March 17, 2002). The terms or
parameters of the state bar recommendations and reports vary.
2.
At the time, two states, Washington and Texas, had already commenced efforts
to define the "practice of law".
3.
The House recommendations drew heavily on the New York State Bar
Association Report. AIERICAN BARASS'N COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, at http:llabanet.org/cpr/mdp-reportlOf.html (last visited Jan. 26,
2002) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT]; N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CoMM. ON THE LAW
GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE
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This paper argues that the ABA's UPL directive was misguided. Prosecuting
UPL actions does not address the core value concerns of those who oppose the
emergence or growth of MDPs and therefore is the wrong means for addressing MDP.
Moreover, attempts to refine the definition of the "practice of law" in the context of
UPL could narrow the scope of services that fall within the boundaries of law
practice, with the unintended result that lawyers might not be subject to legal ethics
rules when they render services that fall outside of the definition.
The lesson that should have been learned from the ABA's MDP debates is
that MDPs will be palatable only if preservation of our profession's core values is
ensured. Clients who seek legal advice or representation should continue to receive
those services with guarantees of confidentiality, loyalty, and freedom from
conflicting interests on the part of the provider. The bar, therefore, should focus its
energies on assuring that all lawyers comply with professional regulations when they
provide legal services, regardless of the type of firm that employs them. A definition
of the "practice of law" for this purpose would have meaning. Indeed, it could be
instrumental in addressing the "civil disobedience" of large accounting firms and their
lawyers, who claim not to engage in the practice oflaw but who provide legal services
nonetheless. 4

I. THE ABA RESOLUTION
The ABA House of Delegates resolution rejecting MDP began by affirming
the importance of the legal profession's core values. These were delineated as follows:
a. the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
b. the lawyer's duty competently to exercise independent legal
judgment for the benefit of the client;
c. the lawyer's duty to hold client confidences inviolate;
d. the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the client;
e. the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of law with
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality ofjustice, and
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS (Apr. 2000), at http://iwv.law.comell.edu/ethics/mdp.htm [hereinafter

MAcCRATE REPORT]. The latter report explicitly links a clear statutory definition to "a strong

legislative policy to prevent nonlawyers from engaging in the practice of law, whatever that
may be." Supra, at 373, 376.
Regardless of whether [the state of Washington's] or some other formulation of the
definition of the practice of law is adopted, this Committee recommends that it be combined
with meaningful enforcement mechanisms consistent with NYSBA (and ABA) policy, and that
the unauthorized practice of law be policed with increased vigor, with a view toward protecting
the public against injury at the hands of those who lack the professional training, governmental
oversight, and ethical inculcation of daily licensed attorneys. Supra, at 376.
4.
Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, theHawks oftheProfessionalWorld: They Foul
OurNest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminationson the Issue ofMDPs, 84 MINN. L. REv.
1097 (2000): Lawrence J. Fox, Dan&World: A FreeEnterpriseDream;An EthicsNightmare,
55 Bus. LAW. 1533 (2000).
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5
f. the lawyer's duty to promote access to justice.

With the exception of (e), the list is not controversial.' The resolution also
reaffirmed the substance of ABA Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits the sharing of legal
fees with nonlawyers, and ownership and control of the practice of law by
nonlawyers. The resolution then urged states to take action in three areas: reaffirming
their commitments to vigorously enforcing the law governing lawyers, evaluating and
refining their definitions of the "practice of law," and retaining and enforcing UPL
laws.7
The resolution's postulate regarding the centrality and importance of the
legal profession's core values was never contentious. Both sides in the MDP debates
acknowledged the importance of those values; they differed only in their views as to
whether the legal profession's core values could be protected where legal services
were rendered through MDPs. Indeed, the ABA MDP Commission itself explicitly
asserted, immediately after making its principal recommendation that lawyers be
permitted to share legal fees with nonlawyers, that:
This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that protects
the public and preserves the core values of the legal profession,
including competence, independence of professional judgment,
protection of confidential client information, loyalty to the client
through the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico
obligations.8
Moreover, the ABA MDP Commission declared that "obligations of all lawyers to
observe the rules of professional conduct should not be altered." 9
According to a brief report accompanying the ABA House of Delegates
resolution, 10 the sponsors relied heavily on a 388-page report prepared by a committee
of the New York State Bar Association chaired by Robert MacCrate (MacCrate
Report), 1 which reached essentially the same conclusions as the House ofDelegates.
The MacCrate Report describes a "strong legislative policy to prevent nonlawyers

5.

AMERICAN

BAR
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HoURsE
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MULTIDISCIPLINARY

PRACTICE,

at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/

mdprecomlOf.html (last visited Mar, 17, 2002) [hereinafter A.B.A. RECOMMENDATIONS].
6.
One might argue that this duty neither exists nor reflects a core value of the legal
profession. Inclusion of this purported duty, to help maintain a single profession of law, among
the others, is self-serving.
7.
The resolution also directs the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility to review the Model Rules and recommend any changes necessary
to assure the preservation and protection of core values in the context of strategic alliances and
other contractual relationships between lawyers and nonlegal professional service providers,
and discharges the ABA Commission on MDP. A.B.A. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5.
8.
Id. Similarly, the District of Columbia Special Commission on MDP stressed the
centrality and importance of core values in its preliminary report supporting the notion ofMDP.
D.C. SPECIAL COMM'N ON MDP, PRELIMINARY REPORT AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 3, 13,
17-19, at http://vww.dcbar.org/about-bar/mdpcommittee.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
9.
A.B.A. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5.
10.
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 3.
l1.
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3.
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from engaging in the practice of law."' 12 The Report addresses definitional issues,
however, only in the context of UPL and recommends both that New York adopt 13a
"clearly delineated and analytically supportable definition of the practice of law"'
and that the new definition "be combined with meaningful [UPL] enforcement
mechanisms."' 4

H. THE ABA DIREcTwEs WERE MISGUIDED
A. MDP isNot a UPL Problem
In the context of MDPs, UPL is a red herring. In fact, legal services provided
by MDPs would always constitute the authorizedpractice of law because they would
be rendered by lawyers or, as in the tax area, legal services provided by IVIDPs would
be rendered by nonlawyers who are specifically, but limitedly, authorized to practice
law.' 5 While the MDP movement within the organized bar was initiated because
nonlawyer-controlled entities, primarily the large "Big Five" accounting firms, were
beginning to provide legal services to their clients,' 6 none of the participants in the
debates ever considered it even marginally acceptable for nonlawyers within an
organization to provide legal services (unless, of course, the law already permitted
them to do so). Indeed, the Big Five were busily staffing their legal departments with
attorneys.
Pursuing MDPs through UPL actions would likely fail on policy grounds
because MDP legal clients would be represented by competent lawyers who are
licensed to practice and are subject to the ethical obligations and professional
regulations of their profession. It is difficult to envision a court holding that such
individuals are engaged in unauthorized behavior. Similarly, where legal services are
provided by nonlawyers who are authorized by law to provide such services, there is
no UPL.' 7
UPL actions taken on a large scale also risk failure due to the relative lack of
resources available to prosecute them. Despite the great pains to which proponents of
MDP went in asserting the broad impact of the phenomenon outside of tax practice, it
has always been clear that it was the escalating tax practices of Big Five firms which
aroused the intense interest and concern on both sides of the debate. While UPL
12.
Id. at 373.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 376.
15.
For example, nonawyers are permitted to practice before the IRS. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-22. They are also permitted to practice before the United States Patent
Office and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379
(1963) (discussing federal statute which authorizes nonlawyers to practice before U.S. Patent
Office); 8 C.F.R. § 292.1-.2 (2002) (permitting nonlawyers to practice before Immigration and
Naturalization Service).
16.
Actually, the Big Five had been providing largely the same sorts of services for
years. What distinguished recent activity was the significant growth in practice size and the
aggressive recruitment of lawyers at all levels of practice.
17.
Indeed, because nonlawyer professionals are often subject to their own
professions' regulations, including licensure and standards of practice, courts could be
persuaded that sufficient safeguards exist to protect the interests of their clients, as well.
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actions against the Big Five are not likely to succeed in any event (because accounting
firms by and large are engaged in the authorized practice of law or because the
perpetrators are lawyers or nonlawyers acting within the scope of their legal
authority), the Big Five have already demonstrated18a willingness to commit
substantial resources to defending against UPL claims.
1. Authorized PracticeofLaw
Accountants and accounting firms often engage in the authorized practice of
law. Under regulations commonly referred to as Circular 230, certified public
accountants (CPAs), enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries are permitted to engage in
practice before the IRS,19 even when that practice involves the use of legal knowledge
and skills. In addition, under Rule 200 of the United States Tax Court, nonlawyers
who pass an examination are eligible to practice before the court. Federal regulation
of tax practice in these 2areas,
therefore, preempts the application of state regulation of
0
unauthorized practice.
Because Circular 230 does not apply in some areas of tax practice, for
example, drafting legal documents and litigation in courts other than the Tax Court,
accountants do risk UPL charges if they engage in non-preempted activities.
Therefore, accounting firms are well advised to assiduously avoid such activities. In
transactional planning, accountants are often called upon to render opinions as to
probable tax consequences. Some respected commentators believe that these activities
do not constitute UPL so long as the tax issues do not present legal uncertainties,
notwithstanding that legal knowledge and analytic skills are applied. 21 Where there
are legal uncertainties, however, the firms arguably do engage in UPL. If, as appears
to be the case, Big Five accounting firms render written opinions in complex
transactions involving legal uncertainties, then they are vulnerable to UPL actions.
18.
In actuality, there are or will be more than five firms. In recent years, each of the
Big Five firms has sold or spun off its consulting practice or has announced its intention of
doing so. See Ken Brown, Andersen Consulting Wins Independence,WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,2000,
at A3; Kevin J. Delaney & Elizabeth MacDonald, Ernst & Young To Sell Business To Cap
Gemini, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at C15; Raymond Hennessey, 1PO Outlook: KPMG
Consulting Will Complete SeparationWith $1BillionIPO, WALL ST. J., May 8,2000, at C21;
Rachel Emma Silverman, Questioningthe Books: Deloitte to SeparateConsultingServices
From Audit Business, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8; Jonathan Weil & Rachel Emma
Silverman, Consulting Unit of Accountant to Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan 31, 2002, at A3
(PriceWaterhouse Coopers). There are currently no legal impediments on audit firms
reconstituting their consulting businesses after a split-up. Tax consulting practices typically
remain in the audit firm.
19.
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2002). The Treasury Department maintains
Circular 230 under its statutory authority to regulate the practice of representatives before the
department. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)-(b) (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (2000).
20.
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (holding that a state may not prohibit
nonlawyers from engaging in law practice before the U.S. Patent Office because federal
regulations explicitly permit them to practice); see also Grace v. Allen, 407 S.W. 2d 321 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) (holding that services rendered by accountants who were admitted to practice
before the IRS, in connection with contesting a federal income tax assessment, were not UPL);
see generally Bernard Wolfman et al., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 801.2 (3d ed. 1995).
21.
Wolfman et al., supra note 20, at § 801.3.1.2.
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A second area of vulnerability exists when accounting firms advise their
clients to initiate litigation in Tax Court. Such advice, if properly rendered, involves
analyzing applicable precedent and relative procedural advantages in all three fora in
which litigation of tax controversies may occur (Tax Court, federal district court, and
Court of Federal Claims), and concluding that the likelihood of success is greatest in
Tax Court. Of course, if the accounting firm concludes that another forum is
preferable and so advises its client, that too would be the practice of law. As a
practical matter, accounting finms have not aggressively moved into the litigation
arena and, therefore, their UPL exposure in this area appears to be minimal. 22
Oddly, accounting finns and their lawyers claim not to engage in the practice
of law. They may do this to minimize the risk of UPL actions23 or because they
believe that employees who are admitted to the bar are not subject to such potentially
troubling ethical precepts as the obligation to maintain client confidentiality, conflict
of interest rules, and proscriptions against sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, by
virtue of not engaging in law practice. 24 This approach arguably is inconsistent with
ABA Informal Opinion 328, which states that lawyers who engage in a second
occupation that is so law-related as to involve some practice of law are held to the
standards of the bar in the second occupation because, in carrying on a law-related
profession, a lawyer "almost inevitably will engage to some extent in the practice of
law, even though the activities are such that a layman can engage in them without

22.
However, see Sheryl Stratton, More Big Five Attorneys Appearing in Court,
1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 23-6, reporting that at least three of the Big Five firms have formally
announced that they will begin representing clients in Tax Court litigation. However, there are
no reports on the extent of such activities. When the Securities and Exchange Commission
issued new rules on auditor independence in February 2001, it did not expressly prohibit
accounting firms from representing audit clients before the U.S. Tax Court. See Phillip
Azzollini, The SECt New Rules on Auditor Independence,BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y
REP., Nov. 2001, at 1. Because the new rules consider independence impaired, as a general
matter, if accountants provide services for which they must be admitted to practice before a
court, it is unclear whether representation in Tax Court is permissible. Stuart Harden, WillAll
the PiecesFit?AccountingandAuditingRules, CALIF. CPA, Sept. 1,2001, at 44; Tom Purcell
& David Lifson, Auditor Independence and Tax Practitioners,J. ACCT., June 2001, at 7174,
availableat 2001 WL 11637254.

23.

Nonlegal organizations are generally prohibited from practicing law, even if

licensed attorneys provide the services. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
840 (1986); Ted Schneyer, MultidisciplinaryPractice,ProfessionalRegulation, andthe AntiInterferencePrinciplein LegalEthics,84 MINN.L. REV.1469, 1510-14 (2000) (describing the

history of proscriptions against practice of law by "lay intermediaries"); see also Bruce A.
Green, The DisciplinaryRestrictionson MultidisciplinaryPractice:Their Derivation, Their
Development, and Some Implicationsfor the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1115

(2000).
24.
In a New York ethics opinion, an attorney proposed forming a professional
relationship with an accountant for the purpose of providing clients with tax-related legal and
accounting services. The Opinion concluded, interalia,that an attorney in such a relationship
would be aiding the accountant in UPL. While the Opinion acknowledged that the accountant
was legally authorized to provide tax services, it nonetheless ruled that the relationship would
create a danger that the accountant would direct or control the lawyer's judgment. N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Prof 1Ethics, Op. 557 (1984), availableat 1984 WL 50012.
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being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law."5 Thus, if a lawyer's second
occupation is so law-related that her work will necessarily or inseparably involve the
practice of law, then the lawyer is considered to be engaged in the practice of law
while conducting that second occupation and is held to the standards of the bar with
respect thereto. While ABA Formal Opinion 328 addresses only the applicability of
lawyers' ethics rules to lawyers who simultaneously practice law and another related
profession out of the same office, and, therefore, does not technically apply to lawyers
who practice only a law-related profession and do not explicitly hold themselves out
as offering legal services, 26 the reasoning of the Opinion applies equally in both
contexts. If the services rendered by a licensed attorney through an MDP are the type
of services that would be considered law practice if rendered through a traditional law
office, the lawyer should be required to comply with the rules of the bar in rendering
those services. It is on this issue, rather than on UPL, that the bar should be focusing
its anti-MDP endeavors.
2. UPL Actions Will Failon Policy Grounds
UPL actions with respect to nonlawyer-controlled entities in which lawyers
render the legal services are likely to fail on policy grounds. Historically, of course,
UPL cases have generally been brought against nonlawyers. Resolution of these cases
usually turns on answering questions like: do clients really need a lawyer to provide
the service in question, and is the public interest served by requiring that seekers of
services obtain them only from lawyers?27 Restricting the practice of law to lawyers is
thought to provide benefits to the public: competent representation by trained
professionals, commitment to ethical obligations enforced by disciplinary regulations,
25.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972).
Numerous state bar ethics committees have opined similarly. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Standing
Comm. on Prof 1Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999), availableat 1999
WL 692059 (stating that attorney offering investment advisory services is subject to California
Rules of Professional Conduct); Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. onProf l Ethics, Op. 01-06 (2001),
availableat 2001 WL 694587 (practicing lawyer engaging in the dual practice of law and
financial planning services is subject to Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct in both
professions); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Informal Op. 90157, availableat 1990 WL 709670 (stating that lawyer engaged in law and accounting practices
must conduct nonlegal practice in compliance with lawyers' professional rules when second
occupation involves law-related activities); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op.
01-05 (2001), availableat 2001 WL 829237 (lawyer functioning as a real estate agent or broker
is subject to lawyers' professional rules even where the lawyer is an inactive member of the
state bar); cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Informal Op. 83-1497 (1983)
(indicating Model Code does not prohibit lawyer/physician from practicing both law and
medicine, even from same office, or from serving same client/patient as both lawyer and
physician, if distinction between services as a lawyer and physician is made clear and
lawyer/physician otherwise complies with Model Code with respect to furnishing legal advice).
26.
It is difficult to conceive that clients do not regard MDP legal services providers
as lawyers, particularly where the clients are aware of the providers' educational and
experiential credentials.
27.
See generallyDerek A. Denckla, Nonlawyersandthe UnauthorizedPracticeof
Law: An Overview of the Legal andEthicalParameters,67 FORDHAML. REV. 2581, 2588-89
(1999).
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and protection of confidential information.25 In specific instances, however, courts
have found that the public interest is served by permitting nonlawyers to act. For
example, some courts have found that the public interest justifies permitting
nonlawyers to prepare real estate contracts or to conduct residential real estate
closings.
The problem with UPL actions against MDPs in which lawyers provide the
legal services is that it is difficult to imagine justifying arguments that representation
was not competent where the person who rendered the services complied with all of
the training and licensure requirements imposed by the legal profession. If it were
alleged that representation was competent but not ethical, it likewise would be
doubtful that a court would impose UPL sanctions. (A more direct avenue to deal with
ethical lapses, of course, would be disciplinary proceedings with respect to alleged
violations of lawyers' practice rules.) If there is client demand for MDP and the
clients understand the limitations, if any, of the professional firms from which
services are requested, how can the legal profession persuade courts that UPL
restrictions are in the best interests of those clients? Indeed, too much success in UPL
actions could increase the risk that state legislatures would be called upon to amend
to be rendered by lawyers employed by
UPL laws to permit certain types of services
29
nonlawyers, or even by nonlawyers.
3. Lack of Resources
As a practical matter, UPL actions will not succeed. The bar traditionally has
been unwilling to commit substantial funds 30 or time to UPL claims and there is little
reason to expect a change. Moreover, a memorable UPL action in Texas several years
ago suggests that the bar would refrain from pursuing large firms for fear that
antagonizing them would have significant financial consequences to lawyers and law
firms.
28.
Id. at 2581; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4
cmt. b (2000) ("The primary justification given for unauthorized practice limitations was that of
consumer protection-to protect consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the
significant risk of harm believed to be threatened by the nonlawyerpractitioner's incompetence
or lack of ethical constraints.").
29.
In an analogous situation, a federal district in Texas ruled in 1999 that
publication and sale of certain legal self-help software, Quicken Family Lawyer, violated
Texas' unauthorized practice statute, and issued an injunction banning further sales of the
software. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm.v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97CV-2859-H,
1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 22, 1999). The Texas Legislature responded by amending the
statutory definition of "practice of law" to exclude "the design, creation, publication,
distribution, display, or sale... [of] computer software, or similar products if the products
clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an
attorney." TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.101(c) (West 2002). The district court decision was
vacated and remanded in light of the amended statute. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v.
Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
30.
For example, in her 1981 survey of UPL policies and practices among the fifty
states, Professor Deborah Rhode noted that the UPL committees in virtually every state were
headed by part-time practitioners. Deborah L. Rhode, Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly:.A
Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L.
REV.1, 23 (1981).
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In June 1997, long before ABA activities in the M]P areahad commenced, a
complaint was filed with the State of Texas' Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
alleging that Arthur Andersen engaged in the practice of law in Texas by undertaking
the following acts:
1. Employing persons with law degrees and who are admitted to the
bar of the state of Texas and elsewhere and who offer legal services to
the public without the firm having a law license or otherwise permitted
to offer legal service,
2. Forming legal entities and drafting documents for clients without the
appropriate use of licensed attorneys,
3. Drafting estate planning documents, including trusts, for clients, as
well as documents for organization of corporations and partnerships,
4. Preparing and filing court pleadings, especially in the U.S. Tax
Court, and
31
5. Holding itself out to the public as offering legal services.
The complaint attracted considerable attention. Many observers believed that
the outcome of the ensuing investigation would influence 32
the direction of the issue of
accountants practicing law throughout the United States.
The Texas UPL Committee was small and consisted of only a few volunteer
lawyers. Its annual budget was a mere $40,000.33 Arthur Andersen hired three top law
firms to defend against the proceedings. Their defense has been characterized as
"tough" and as a "hardball litigation approach." For example, the firms were accused
of being "not overly forthcoming in producing documents" and as "narrowly
interpret[ing] document
requests, respond[ing] only to precisely and narrowly drawn
34
questions and so on."
The Texas committee ultimately decided to terminate its investigation
because it had no proof of unauthorized practice violations. 35 The committee
reportedly was frustrated because no one in the organized bar could be found who
would talk about Arthur Andersen on the record. One former State Bar of Texas Tax
Section leader asserted that: ex-employees were reluctant to speak publicly about
Andersen's practices; law firms were afraid to have their names used publicly; inhouse counsels of publicly traded corporations would talk privately about the firm's
practices, but not publicly; and few were interested in antagonizing Arthur Andersen.
He also contended that large law firms were unwilling to step in to prosecute the
action on apro bono or volunteer basis in large part because conflicts of interest were
present or because the firms would be unable to get Arthur Andersen work in the
future because of conflicts of interest created as a result of participating in this action.
31.
The complaint is quoted in William D. Elliot, UnauthorizedPracticeof Law:
Failureof Proofor Failureof Will?, 81 TAx NOTES 517 (1998). Arthur Andersen's website
described the "Legal Services" offered by the firm. Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Tom Herman, TaxReport,WALL ST. J., July 29,1998, atAl; see also Arthur S.
Hayes, Bean Counters Win; Accountants vs. Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A4.
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In addition, they were afraid, he said, that other Big Five accounting firms would
retaliate by withholding work. 6
37
Arthur Andersen hailed the resolution of the Texas matter as a success.
Indeed, shortly after the Texas investigation ended, two other Big Five accounting
firms publicly announced that they would begin representing firm clients in litigation
before the U.S. Tax Court,38 an act thought, in large measure, to have precipitated the
Texas proceedings in the first place because it so brazenly reflected a stride
into the
39
domain traditionally reserved only for lawyers in traditional law firms.
B. Narrowingthe Definition of "PracticeofLaw" Will Not Benefit the Public
Efforts to refine the definition ofthe "practice of law" in the context of UPL,
generally, could lead to a narrow definition, excluding what traditionally have been
regarded as legal services. The unintended result could be that lawyers might not
consider themselves subject to legal ethics rules when they render services that fall
outside of the definition. Such a narrowing would not serve either the legal
profession's or the public's interests in ensuring the broadest application of the core
values of the legal profession. Any regulatory framework should provide for the
broadest possible definition of legal practice, so as to bring activities of legal
professionals within the ambit of the ethical guidelines, yet provide opportunities for
nonlawyers to provide services in areas which the courts deem would serve the public
interest.
Reconsideration of the definition of the "practice of law" must take into
account the needs or demands of nonlawyers who already provide what they believe
are lawful services and the sentiments of those who advocate the inclusion, for public
policy reasons, of lay-provided services which they believe should be lawful. A
general definition along the lines of some states' current statutes, for example, "the
doing of any act for another person usually done by attorneys at law in the course of
their profession," 40 could subsume many of these activities. A definition of law
practice for UPL purposes, therefore, must make allowance for situations in which
nonlawyers may provide services that would be considered the "practice of law" if
rendered by a lawyer.
The definition of the "practice of law" for purposes of UPL (i.e., preventing
nonlawyers from providing legal services) need not be the same as for professional
regulatory purposes (i.e., regulating the conduct of lawyers). If there is only one
36.
Elliot, supranote 31; see also Sheryl Stratton, UnauthorizedPracticeComplaint
Against Arthur Andersen Dismissed, 80 TAX NOTES 765 (1998).
37.
Press Release, Arthur Andersen, Texas Panel Dismisses Complaint Against
Arthur Andersen (July 29, 1998), available at LexisNexis, PR Newswire; see also John
Niemann, The Real Story: A Participantk View of the Texas UPLProceeding,81 TAx NOTES
1015 (1998).
38.
In Peoplefeeders, Inc. v. Comm P,77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349 (1999), the court
specifically noted that Arthur Andersen had prepared and filed the taxpayer's petition.
39.
See Stratton,supranote 22, at 23-6; see also KPMG Peat Manvick, LLP, KMiPG
Release on ProvidingTax Litigation Services, 1999 TAx NoTEs TODAY 23-26 (press release
announcing KPMG's decision to begin representing clients in Tax Court litigation).
40.
R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-27-2 (2001).
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definition, lawyers could claim that some services performed by them do not amount
to the practice of law and, therefore, are not subject to professional regulation. If the
profession's core values are to have meaning, however, lawyers must be expected to
comply with ethical principles set forth in regulatory codes whenever they provide
professional services to clients. Therefore, the legal profession and, by extension, the
public benefit when law practice is defined broadly.4 '
The approach taken by the state of Washington, which recently adopted a
definition of the "practice of law,' 4 2 attempts to reconcile the competing interests of
the bar in having a broad definition with the interests of nonlegal professionals in
having a narrow one. (A similar definition is currently under consideration in
Texas.) 43 The Washington rule contains a broad, general definition of the practice of
law and then designates which persons or professions, other than lawyers, are entitled
to engage in specific conduct that falls within the practice of law and the
circumstances under which they may do so. Thus, lawyers providing certain types of
services presumably would be subject to the rules of lawyers' ethics, but a nonlawyer
providing similar services would not be considered as engaged in unauthorized
practice.
While the Washington/Texas approach reflects constructive movement, it
raises two further issues. Despite the Texas drafters' description of their goal "to
illuminate where the legal profession is heading and should head," their definition
depicts professional services as they exist today. The catalog of circumstances in
which nonlawyers are permitted to practice law reflects only areas in which
nonlawyers presently practice; these areas are already settled, either as a legal or a
practical matter. The definitions do not anticipate that new areas of law practice might
appropriately be opened to nonlawyers because, for example, there arises a public
need or because nonlawyers perceive a business opportunity that serves a public
good.44 Who could have anticipated ten or fifteen years ago, for example, that the list
ofpermitted practices would include distribution of computer software incorporating
legal advice? The Washington and Texas definitions resolve matters only in the
present tense. Although they provide a framework for analyzing future UPL claims,
41.
ABA Comm.on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972), and
state ethics opinions that follow its reasoning, could be invoked to address this problem. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
42.

WASH. CT.R. GEN. R.24 (2001).

43.

STATE BAR OF TEx. TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATION OF A NEW STATUTORY

DEFINITON FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (Apr. 2001), at http://www.texasbar.

com/newsinfo/newsevents/upltf.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,2002). A similar approach has been
proposed in Arizona. See STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA CONSUMER PROTECTION CONNrrTEE, at http://www.azbar.org/AttomeyResources/
revised rule 3.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,2002); STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, CHANGES PROPOSED
BY THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA TASKFORCEONTHEFuTURE OFTHEPROFESSION (Mar. 2001), at

http://wwwv.azbar.org/AttorneyResources/prop_3 1.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
44.
Others have already argued that professionals from other disciplines should be
permitted to provide limited legal services to underserved populations. E.g., Anthony Bertelli,
Should Social WorkersEngage in the UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw?, 8 B.U. PuB.INT. L.J. 15
(1998) (social workers serving at settlement houses and community centers); Margaret F.
Brown, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure toLiabiityforEngagingin the Unauthorized
Practiceof Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 279 (2001).
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the definitions are likely to stifle innovation in the future because creativity outside of
the areas listed in today's definition risks UPL sanctions. And, any new practices that
do manage to emerge will once again be subjected to case-by-case litigation against
the backdrop of the same policy considerations that have guided UPL litigation to
date.
Another problem with the Texas approach is that it subjects nonlawyer
service providers to the same "standard of care and ethics as would be applicable to
members of the state bar in similar circumstances." Does this mean that nonlawyers
are subject to conflicts rules? And if so, how can a real estate broker,45 who represents
the seller and whose commission depends upon the consummation of a sale, rightfully
advise a purchaser of real estate regarding a real estate contract? 46 Does this mean that
accountants who provide tax advice or opinions are subject to lawyers' confidentiality
and conflicts rules?
An alternative approach would be to maintain two separate definitions of the
practice of law, one for lawyers and one for nonlawyers. A states' legal ethics code
could define the practice of law for purposes of assuring that lawyers are subject to
those rules whenever they provide legal services in the practice of law, regardless of
the type of firm for which they work and regardless of self-styled claims regarding the
nature of their practices. UPL actions with respect to nonlawyers could be governed
by another definition, which would provide exceptions appropriate in light of public
policy concerns. A one-size-fits-all definition ultimately is not workable.
IMI. CLOSING THOUGHTS
The newspapers these days are filled with stories of the demise of Enron.
Both the media and government, at various levels, are attempting to determine
whether Enron's auditor, Big Five accounting firm Andersen,47 acted appropriately
with respect to its knowledge of Enron's financial situation. In addition to having
shredded Enron-related documents, Andersen has been accused of withholding
information that it should have disclosed, and of having done so out of fear that it
45.
The Texas proposal does not permit real estate brokers to complete real estate
forms or contracts. In some states, however, preparation by nonlawyers of real estate transfer
documents does not constitute the practice of law. See, e.g., In re OpinionNo. 26 of Comm. on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1995) (finding that the public interest
justifies permitting activities that would be the practice of law if engaged in by lawyers, such as
conducting residential real estate closings and settlements, without the presence of attorneys);
Culturn v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1985) (holding that the act of a
licensed realtor in completing a form earnest money agreement constituted the practice of law,
but was not unauthorized).
46.
For an illuminating discussion of the debate on whether real estate brokers
should be permitted to prepare residential real estate contracts, see Lowell Willinger &
Christina Lee, DebatingPreparationof ContractsofSale by Brokers,N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2001,

at 4.
47.
Arthur Andersen changed its name to Andersen in March 2001. According to the
Wall Street Journal, "The change marks an attempt by the firm to reshape its image so the
public will view it as a provider of a wide range ofprofessional services, including consulting,
rather than just as an audit and tax firm." Jonathan Weil, Big Five Firm Will Alter Name To
Andersen, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at CIO.
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would lose the substantial fees it received for business consulting services rendered to
Enron. Moreover, the newspapers are reporting that Enron paid no federal income tax
for several years preceding its bankruptcy filing both because it took hefty deductions
with respect to employee stock options when they were exercised and because Enron
invested in corporate tax shelters.
The extent to which lawyers employed by Arthur Andersen rendered tax
advice to Enron is not yet clear. But the Andersen/Enron situation highlights very
clearly the importance of protecting the core values reflected in lawyers' ethics rules.
If Andersen lawyers had information that should have been disclosed in Enron's
financial statements, were they obliged to disclose or to maintain confidences? Was
their first loyalty to Enron, their client, or to the public? If there are any public
allegations against Andersen lawyers, they will raise the question of the lawyer's role
and duties. UPL, however, will have no role in the discussion.
At the end of the day, the campaign to enforce UPL as an antidote to MDP
will amount to nothing. Whether due to a mismatch in resources or a fear of losing,
the bar will neither attempt to enforce UPL nor succeed in UPL actions against MDPs.
Moreover, if it were easy to define the "practice of law" in the first instance, it would
have already been done. UPL statutes and lawyers' ethics codes would be clear. UPL
actions would not have been relegated to case-by-case deliberation. Indeed, the same
lack of definitional clarity has coexisted in defining legal advice or services for
purposes of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, where communications in
while communications in
connection with legal advice or services are privileged
48
connection with business advice or services are not.
Attempts to refie the definition of law practice undoubtedly will, and
should, continue, whether inspired by the ABA House of Delegates directive or the
movements in Washington and Texas. Tying those exercises to attempts at policing
UPL, however, would be a mistake in the context of MDPs. The bar should concern
itself with its own, to make sure that lawyers are meeting, and not ignoring, their
ethical standards. If we are correct in believing that the public is served when lawyers
apply their legal skills within the framework ofprofessional regulations, then clients
will continue to seek out the services of lawyers. If we can regulate the lawyers, we
will have accomplished a great deal.

48.
An extensive 1989 survey ofjudges in New York City revealed that whether a
communication relates to legal advice or business advice is one of the most frequent and
difficult issues before their courts. See Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client
Privilege:A Study of the Participants,63 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 191, 256, n. 182 (1989). Notably,
several courts have held that tax planning is legal advice. In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 170
B.R. 331 (S.D. Ohio 1994). In United States v. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186,1190-93 (S.D. Iowa
1983), the court distinguished between tax planning and "after-the-fact services" and opined
that pre-transactional tax planning is presumptively legal advice for purposes of the privilege.
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